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Abstract: The location of financial activities is traditionally characterized by a 
great deal of inertia. However, the boom in new information and communication 
technologies, the globalization of economies and the 2007-08 financial crisis have 
considerably modified the geography of finance. Financial globalization has, first 
of all, had a heavy impact on the level of spatial concentration / dispersion of 
activities.  The  dynamics  have  not  acted  in  a  uniform  way  –  schematically 
speaking three levels can be distinguished. On the urban scale, financial activities 
have been spread out (suburbanization), while on the regional scale or the national 
scale, due to financial globalization, financial activities have been more tightly 
grouped. Lastly, on the international scale, a movement of dispersion has mainly 
been  observed,  along  with  a  specialization  of  financial  centers.  The  2007-08 
financial crisis might well accentuate this last effect and cause an upheaval in 
world  hierarchy.  Actually,  the  financial  centers  that  are  most  elastic  to  the 
economic situation – London, New York and tax havens – are massively losing 
jobs,  while  the  stock  markets  in  Shanghai,  Hong  Kong  and  Bombay  are  now 
upstaging them as major players.  
Keywords: Financial Geography, International Financial Centers, Globalization, 
Informational Externalities. 
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Will the financial crisis put an end to the supremacy of Wall Street and the City over other 
stock markets? As of the end of April 2009, London was, for the first time, no longer listed in 
the Top 5 list of stock exchanges in terms of market capitalization. New York, Tokyo, the 
Nasdaq,  Euronext,  and  then  Shanghai  successively  displaced  what  had  been  the  world's 
number  one  financial  center  for  two  centuries. As  of  the  first  quarter  of  2009,  the  great 
majority of IPOs involved countries in Asia and the Middle East. It can be argued that China, 
overheating on an inflow of liquid assets, is the new theater of a speculation bubble and that 
Asian  companies  newly  listed  are  in  no  way  comparable  to  their American  counterparts. 
However, when all is said and done, Wall Street and the City have still lost their competitive 
edge.  
The upheaval seen in the world's financial geography is remarkable in that the hierarchy of 
financial centers is traditionally characterized by a great deal of inertia. Another important 
point is that these changes were not triggered by the 2007-08 financial crisis – the crisis only 
accelerated  the  rate  of  change.  In  the  last  twenty  years  or  so,  the  development  of  new 
information  and  communication  technologies  (NICT)  and  the  liberalization  of  economies 
have gradually, but thoroughly reshaped the world's financial geography. Is this something to 
worry about? How might these changes impact national economies? 
  
Competition between financial markets: what is at stake? 
Political authorities' defense of their financial centers is an established fact (Cassis, 2006) and 
the present situation is no exception to the rule. Despite the financial crisis and the need for 
countries to cooperate, competition between financial centers has not completely ground to a 
halt.  Each  government  continues  to  defend  its  own  financial  system.  It  is  true  that  the 
financial system fulfills functions required for economies to operate smoothly (Merton, 1995) 
and a number of empirical studies conclude that finance leads growth (Levine, 2005). This is 
why governments have traditionally defended the presence of financial intermediaries and 
markets  within  their  borders.  However,  in  a  globalized  economic  world  with  free  capital 
flows, this argument is no longer relevant. In fact, with present-day technology the functions 
carried out by financial systems could theoretically be fulfilled at a supranational level.  
So what is behind the defense of domestic financial centers today? Reasons of a symbolic 
nature very probably come into play (Ferguson, 2001). The economic – and geopolitical – 
power of a country is associated with its financial power. Having a financial center means 
maintaining  a  certain  status  on  the  international  scene. Additionally,  financial  activities  – 
particularly market activities – are proof that emerging countries adhere to the Anglo-Saxon 
model and have adopted capitalism as a regulatory system.
1 Still, symbolic reasons are not the 
only argument.  
The defense of financial centers is mainly justified by the importance of the financial sector in 
the economy. In 2006, i.e. shortly before the crisis began, the financial industry in the United 
States accounted for over 6.5 million direct jobs (4.3% of total employment) and salaries 
worth $ 500 billion (8.2% of total salaries)
2, with the corresponding percentages being about 
the same in the United Kingdom. In the European Union, financial activities represented 6% 
of the GDP and directly involved over five million employees. This is twice the working 
                                                
1 Ironically, the Warsaw stock exchange (Gielda) is now located on the site of the former headquarters of the 
Polish Unified Workers Party (PZPR). 
2 See Philippon (2008) for a discussion of employment dynamics since 1860 in the United States financial sector. population of Ireland and equal to the working population of Belgium, Austria or Portugal.
3 
Moreover, the financial activities are even more significant on a regional level. In 2006 they 
accounted for over 10% of the jobs in London, in the state of New York or in Paris (over 20% 
if the focus is limited to the City of London or to New York City). This is without factoring in 
the ancillary jobs in information technology, law, for example.  
In addition, financial activities are usually high value-added undertakings that require a highly 
qualified workforce. Salaries in the sector are consequently 1.5 to 2.5 times higher than the 
average (cf. Philippon and Reshef, 2008): employees in the banking-finance-insurance sector 
account for 16% of total salary value in London and up to 25% in New York City!  
 
Towards a new financial geography? 
Given the influence of the financial sector in the economy, the consequences of the financial 
crisis have become disastrous for financial centers. London, New York and Dublin have seen 
a drastic drop in hiring and employment volumes in the financial sector. This empirical fact 
should not be allowed to hide reality: changes in the location of financial activities go deeper 
and began to make themselves felt in the 1900's.  
With financial globalization, there has been a thorough reorganization of activities. A new 
geography  of  finance  has  emerged  with,  first  of  all,  activities  being  transferred  from  the 
historical  heart  of  big  cities  to  the  peripheral  areas. This  suburbanization  heralds  a  more 
profound  movement  of  delocalization  of  financial  activities,  at  least  as  far  as  the  most 
standardized activities are concerned. The problem of delocalizations is posed in different 
terms for high value-added activities. These activities are characterized by manpower demand 
according  to  opportunities  on  the  financial  market  and  the  existence  of  externalities  of 
proximity  that  justify  the  agglomeration  of  activities.  Manpower  supply  is  highly  mobile 
between financial centers and choices are made on the basis of economic considerations (base 
salary  and  bonuses),  but  also  according  to  extra-economic  considerations  (quality  of  life, 
health  coverage,  etc.).  Although  spatial  dynamics  on  the  international  scale  have  been 
dominated by manpower demand in the last twenty years, thereby inducing the centralization 
of activities in certain financial centers, the crisis could bring about some modifications in this 
set-up. The workforce might well proceed to opt for new geographical choices where extra-
economic considerations would be as important as salaries. The centripetal trend could be 
reversed in favor of a dispersion of financial centers based on employees' search for a certain 
quality of life for themselves and their families (e.g. Switzerland, Paris). Lastly, the booming 
emerging stock markets in the Middle East and Asia need to be closely watched.  
To provide an understanding of the future dynamics of the location of financial activities we 
need to redefine the notion of financial market (Part 1) and then specify the centripetal and 
centrifugal  forces  at  work  on  the  urban scale, as  well  as  the  international scale  (Part  2). 
Following this, we will be in a position to propose our view of the future landscape of the 
financial industry (Part 3).  
 
                                                
3 Sources: Base STAN (OECD) and Eurostat. FINANCIAL CENTERS 
The concept of a financial center is rather difficult to define. Often it is (implicitly) identified 
with the stock market, which is easy to understand as long as the negotiation of stocks and 
shares requires physical presence. In this case the stock market floor is the node that financial 
activities are organized around. In order to guarantee sure and fast access to information, all 
players  in  finance  –  banks,  insurance,  along  with  ancillary  activities  (law,  accounting, 
information technology, consultancy, analysis, the media, etc.) – will be situated near this 
node. In this case, the geographical concentration of financial activities is extreme, as was 
true in the eighties for the top three financial centers in the order proposed by Reed (1981): 
London, New York and Paris. Until the end of the decade the Square Mile centralized all the 
financial establishments in London on 2.6 km² and in New York, financial activities were 
concentrated on the few streets around Wall Street known as the Financial District. Lastly, 
Brongniart Palace and the “grands boulevards” (9th, 8th and 2nd districts) were the scene of 
the financial activities of Paris's financial center.  
The  development  of  new  information  and  communication  technologies  has  considerably 
modified this geography. Dematerialization of stocks and shares, along with rapid and secure 
data  transfer  (for  the  flow  of  orders  as  well  as  information),  no  longer  require  financial 
activities to be concentrated. Stock market floors have been deserted one after the other – with 
the notable exception of the New York Stock Exchange, but for how long? They have been 
replaced by IT networks, with one of the main advantages being that agents can take part in 
the market wherever they may be. Since the stock market is no longer a physical place where 
stocks and shares are exchanged but a virtual structure, it really makes no sense any more to 
identify financial centers with stock markets.   
Another way of defining the concept of financial center is to take its systemic nature into 
account. For example, for the Banque de France (Hannoun, 2000; Duvivier, 2004) financial 
centers are defined as “meeting places provided for a large number of players who contribute 
to the smooth operation of financial markets within ecosystems, giving rise to significant 
synergies”. This definition emphasizes the essential importance of the effects of inter-industry 
agglomeration. However, it does boil down to considering that a financial center worthy of the 
name has to provide a very wide field of activities and that practically all the professional 
categories  in  finance  must  be  exercised  there:  listing  and  trade  of  stocks  and  shares, 
negotiation of derivatives, foreign exchange operations, management of assets, middle and 
back office, venture capital, etc. This is far from being a reality and many financial centers 
among the world's largest would not recognize themselves in this description.  
In the United States, financial centers are historically highly specialized: stock exchanges are 
in New York, derivatives markets are in Chicago and asset management in Boston. What 
about off-shore markets? Luxembourg, for example, claims fully-fledged status as a financial 
center. Although it can not compete with the City, how could the term of financial center fail 
to  apply  when  the  importance  of  financial  activities  is  greater  there  than  in  any  other 
European region
4 and when the Luxembourg stock market is the largest European market for 
corporate bonds?  
The ecosystem approach applies only to certain traditionally comprehensive national financial 
centers,  such  as  London  or  Paris,  during  a  period  when  financial  activities  were  tightly 
intertwined. Financial evolution has led to a vertical disintegration of professional categories. 
The  City,  for  example,  has  delocalized  some  of  its  functions  to  Dublin  or  Jersey  and 
                                                
4 Salaried workers account for 12% of the bank-finance-insurance sector in Luxembourg, compared to 11% for 
London, and between 5% and 6% for the Greater Paris region and the Frankfort region. The European average is 
around 3% (Capelle-Blancard et al., 2007). Guernsey, and Paris management firms have branch offices in Luxembourg.
5  
To discuss the evolution of financial centers properly, we argue that it is important to highlight 
their  diversity.  Recent  research  seems  to  support  this  concept,  for  example  the  study  of 
Faulconbridge (2004), based on the research into geography initiated by Friedmann (1986) 
and  Sassen  (1991,  1999)  on  “world  cities”.  The  advantage  of  this  approach  is  that  it 
emphasizes the complementary nature of financial centers and showing that they operate more 
in  a  network  mode  than  in  competition.  This  led  Faulconbridge  (2004)  to  rank  financial 
centers (one of Reed's ambitions in 1981). In Europe, London alone was defined as a global 
financial center (in the sense that London provides a link with America via New York and 
with Asia via Tokyo). Frankfort was granted the status of continental financial center, while 
Amsterdam, Milan and Paris were seen to play a purely domestic role. It should be noted, that 
this type of ranking exercise is always rather sensitive as it is highly subjective (see also 
Capelle-Blancard and Tadjeddine).
6 In the same register, Poon (2003) and Poon et al. (2004) 
examine the changing concentration in world financial centers in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
The data they used mainly pertain to market capitalization. Among some forty cities under 
study, such major financial centers as Chicago, Osaka and Dublin are missing.  
In this article, we simply define a financial center as a place where financial activities exert a 
significant macroeconomic influence on a circumscribed geographical area.
7 This influence 
can be appreciated in terms of added value or employment, relative to other economic sectors. 
There is no longer any need for a stock market in order to qualify as a financial center. In 
contrast, we feel the need to emphasize the heterogeneity of the labor factor (see also Clark 
and O’Connor, 1997) which, as we will see in the following sections, explains the diversity of 
financial centers. 
 
THE EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON THE LOCATION OF FINANCIAL 
ACTIVITIES 
The  decrease  in  transaction  costs  due  to  liberalization  and  new  information  and 
communication technologies has had two contradictory effects on the location of financial 
activities (see Figure 2 – numbers ￿ to ￿ in the text refer to the figure). The decrease in 
transaction  costs  is  often  –  somewhat  hastily  –  thought  to  allow  a  greater  dispersion  of 
activities,  but  this  is  tantamount  to  ignoring  the  forces  that  act  to  promote  geographical 
concentration.  
With electronic exchanges, agents no longer need to be close to the market to carry out their 
transactions and are seemingly freer to choose their location ￿. Richard O’Brien (1992), in a 
book  with  the  provocative  title  “Global  Financial  Integration:  The  End  of  Geography”, 
concludes  that  financial  establishments  will  be setting  up  house any  and  everywhere.  He 
forecasts a rapid decline in the major financial centers, among other things. The advent of 
online banking and brokerage would seem to prove him right for the time being. Let us point 
                                                
5  Luxembourg  at  the  end  of  the  1960s  and  Ireland  in  the  mid-1980s,  for  instance,  decided  to  practice 
accommodating  fiscal  and  regulatory  policies  to  attract  offshore  subsidiaries  of  financial  groups,  thereby 
developing their financial and economic sectors and rebooting their respective economies. 
6 The criteria to be considered are not only extremely varied, but even when a consensus can be reached about 
some  of  the  variables,  there  still  remains  the  task  of  getting  homogeneous  data,  aggregating  them  and 
determining suitable weighting factors. In addition, Faulconbridge (2004) fails to account for the wide variety in 
financial centers. The financial centers in Luxembourg or Dublin, for example, are not mentioned at any time! 
7 Actually, our approach resembles the simple definition proposed by Porteous (1995, p. 93): “… a financial 
centre  is  an  area,  usually  a  city,  although often  more  localized  within  city  boundaries in  which  high-level 
financial functions are concentrated.”, except that our definition is not restricted to high added value activities. out that the idea that lower transaction costs could act as a dispersion force is not just relevant 
to financial activities. In the 1990s, Frances Cairncross predicts “The death of distance”. On 
the  whole,  this  research  views  globalization  and  new  information  and  communication 
technologies optimistically, as slated to free the world from the constraints of distance. These 
scenarios have been largely called into question on a theoretical as well as empirical level. 
Lower transaction costs are more a centrifugal than a centripetal force. Firstly, with lower 
distance-related costs as a result of new information and communication technologies, the 
other variables that determine the choice of location will be able to exert greater influence. 
Some variables will act in favor of the dispersion of activities, such as congestion costs (real 
estate costs, saturation of downtown areas) and the pressure of competition ￿. In contrast, 
other  variables  will  encourage  geographical  concentration  ￿.  This  is  the  case  for 
advantageous tax policies, accommodating legislation and low-cost manpower whose power 
of  attraction  will  be  felt  farther  away.
8  The  harmonization  of  accounting  and  regulatory 
standards on an international level and, in Europe, the construction of a common market 
reduce  the  importance  of  certain  local  particularities  in  the  choice  of  location,  thereby 
promoting the concentration of activities on a regional, national or international scale. 
Secondly, the choices of each individual in matters of location are not independent of the 
choices of others – whether they be customers, suppliers or competitors. Research by the New 
Economic Geography
9 insist precisely on these strategic interactions and show that clustering 
phenomena are essentially a result of the presence of positive externalities. This paradigm can 
easily be applied to financial activities.  
The concentration of companies in the same industry in the same place has a tendency to 
attract specialized suppliers, e.g. companies in the IT and telecommunications sectors, law 
offices, accounting firms, but also research laboratories. Where one single (non-monopolistic) 
company would fail to attract the suppliers it requires for its production needs, a grouping of 
several companies can succeed. This gathering together of specialized suppliers enhances the 
availability of intermediary goods and services, increases competition and, as a result, exerts a 
lowering pressure on costs.  
The concentration of companies also helps develop the employment pool and the reasoning is 
about the same as for specialized suppliers. These two sources of externalities are often placed 
under  the  same  heading  of  pecuniary  externalities.  The  geographical  grouping  of  a  large 
number of companies in the same industry attracts a large labor force, since the probability of 
finding the desired job quickly is higher in the area.
10 Companies benefit in turn from this 
concentration of specialized manpower as they can more easily fill their job slots with suitable 
personnel. There is a trade-off, however:  high employee turnover and pressure for higher 
salaries. 
Lastly and most important, the concentration of companies yields informational externalities. 
New information and communication technologies promote the circulation of information, 
essentially public information. The more (standardized) public information circulates freely 
and at low cost, the more value private information takes on. Players may no longer need to 
                                                
8 Thanks to technological progress, tax and regulatory havens such as Switzerland, Luxembourg and Delaware 
have become competitors for historical financial centers since the 1970s. This could be considered as a form of 
dispersion of activities. In fact, even though certain establishments or their affiliates are being delocalized, it has 
occurred to the benefit of another financial centers and the activities remain concentrated, even more so than 
before. 
9 Krugman (1991) is often considered to be a pioneering article. 
10 In particular, at least until the 2007-08 financial crisis, the power of attraction of New York or London was 
very high – each year it hosted graduates from the all world over drawn by the prospect of highly lucrative 
careers. keep close to the stock market – which has become virtual – but it is still very much in their 
interest  to  set  up  their  businesses  near  one  another  in  order  to  share  knowledge  and 
information and keep abreast of rumors, buzz, etc.
11 
These three types of externalities are a source of increasing returns in industry and this is what 
really  holds  financial centers  together  ￿.  It is also  what  explains  their  inertia:  clustering 
forces create a lock-in effect.
12 London, which acquired its status as world financial center 
during  the  period  of  the  British  Empire  and  the  supremacy  of  the  pound  sterling  as  an 
international currency, illustrates this phenomenon perfectly (Porteous, 1999). Although some 
of the conditions which initially nourished London's boom are no longer in existence, the city 
continues to be a first-rate financial center, particularly for foreign exchange activities.  
Given the importance of externalities, and therefore in contradiction with Richard O’Brien, it 
is  expected  that  the  recent  drop  in  transaction  costs  due  to  new  information  and 
communication technologies will act in favor of the geographical concentration of financial 
activities – obviously except for those that require direct contact with individuals (tellers' 
windows in banks and financial advisors) or companies (financial analysts). In any case, this 
is nothing new since Garbade and Silber (1978) showed that the telegraph and transatlantic 
transmission cables at the end of the 19th century greatly contributed to the integration of 
markets. Furthermore, Arnold, Hersh, Mulherin and Netter (1999) showed that the dramatic 
decrease in the cost of long distance telephone calls early in the 20th century (a 60% decrease 
between 1925 and 1940) and the regulatory changes following the crisis of 1929 are two 
factors  that  caused  regional  stock  markets  in  the  United  States  to  move  toward 
consolidation.
13 
Up to now in this section we have discussed the general principles involved in the location of 
financial  activities.  In  so  doing,  we  have  implicitly  considered  that  these  activities  are 
homogeneous, but in order to proceed we need to reconsider this hypothesis. Along with the 
process  of  horizontal  integration  of  the  major  players  in  finance  (banks,  insurance,  asset 
management, etc.) ￿, a vertical disintegration of professional categories has been observed 
since the 1990s. The rapidity, traceability and securitization of information flows have, since 
then,  allowed  some  activities  to  be  farmed  out.  In  addition,  liberalization  and  NICT  has 
allowed many tasks to be standardized and reduced externalities at the company level. All of 
this has caused a break-up in the production process of financial services ￿. NICT allow the 
activities  of  the  same  group  to  be  centralized  without  having  to  concentrate  them 
geographically, thereby causing the separation and dispersion of activities formerly grouped 
within the same establishment in the same place. This movement may take on several forms: 
creation  of  affiliates  or  externalization,  transfer  of  activities  to  peripheral  areas  (i.e. 
suburbanization ￿) and delocalization ￿. According to the traditional theory in international 
economics, specialization of financial centers should also be expected in function of their 
comparative advantages ￿.  
New information and communication technologies have therefore not only given rise to a new 
financial geography (without necessarily reducing the geographical concentration due to the 
presence of externalities at the sector level), but they have also contributed to restructure 
                                                
11  This  is  also  what  explains  that  sociocultural  factors  have  such  a  great  influence  on  the  formation  and 
development of financial centers (Thrift, 1994; Agnes, 2000). 
12 Lock-in or path dependency effects are classics in the literature of geographical economics. For example, for 
Ottaviano and Thisse (2001, p.117), “There is a great deal of flexibility in the choice of locations but a strong 
rigidity of spatial structures once the process of agglomeration has started”. 
13 Among the innovations that have helped restructure the financial landscape, mention can be made of the 
appearance in the Middle Ages of the bill of exchange. It remodeled banking geography by creating a European 
network (Favier, 1995), even if its effect on the concentration of financial activities is uncertain. financial groups. The following section deals with these dynamics.  
 


































Note: the mechanisms numbered from ￿ to ￿ are discussed in the text. 
 
 
Globalization along with a high rate of savings in Western and Asian countries has nourished 
financial  innovation,  which  has  been  the  source  of  significant  profits  for  financial 
intermediaries. In this way, financial organizations have generated profits enabling them to 
offer attractive remuneration. Manpower demand for high value-added jobs dominated the 
equilibrium on the labor market, being underpinned by the exploitation of externalities (￿), 
thereby  giving  rise  to  geographical  concentration  and  competitive  pressure  for  higher 
remuneration. Since this was a self-sustaining loop, world financial centers concentrated more 
and  more  financial  activities.  Alternative  asset  management  (Tadjeddine,  2009)  that  has 
emerged  in  Europe  in  the  past  ten  years  is  undoubtedly  the  emblematic  example  of  this 
concentration. The specific nature of this activity – highly skilled employees, high value-
added knowledge services – justify concentration in order to take advantage of informational 
externalities and of the presence of specialized companies. As of the end of 2006, two-thirds 
of the hedge funds in Europe were managed in London (source: IFSL). 
The current crisis has caused hardship in financial organizations by reducing their profits, 
forcing them to practice moderation in the area of salaries. In these conditions, competitive 
pressure becomes stronger ￿, the demand for manpower in financial capitals slows down (a 
double-barreled contraction in the number of jobs and the level of salaries) and the supply of 
mobile  manpower  becomes  dispersed  by  exploiting  the  comparative  advantages  of  the 
different financial centers, both in economic and extra-economic terms. The crisis was just a 
catalyst: the competitive pressure for higher salaries and the costs of congestion were more 
and more economically unsustainable.  TOWARD A NEW GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCIAL ACTIVITIES 
In the preceding section financial globalization was seen to have varied and contradictory 
effects on the location of financial activities. In particular, the NICT has split up professional 
categories in finance and this vertical fragmentation has modified the problematic of choosing 
locations. The issue is no longer to identify the optimum location for a group, but to combine 
the optimum organizational forms and locations for each professional category. As a result, 
we are seeing a profound transformation in the world's financial landscape. In this section, we 
emphasize three characteristic features of this transformation: the transfer of certain activities 
to peripheral areas, the delocalization of certain establishments and the expected dispersion of 
high value-added jobs.  
  
The suburbanization of financial activities 
The  transfer  of  ancillary  activities  to  peripheral  areas  is  known  in  urban  geography  as 
suburbanization.  Ansidei  (2001)  applies  Ota  and  Fujita's  model  of  the  delocalization  of 
ancillary activities (2003) to financial activities. In this model, production is broken down into 
a central unit (in our case, the activities of the front office) and an auxiliary unit (the activities 
of  the  back  office).  Front  office  activities  benefit  from  informational  externalities,  which 
justify  their  being  geographically  concentrated  and  kept  in  the  center,  while  back  office 
activities are delocalized to cut costs. This suburbanization model describes the site transfers 
observed recently in international financial centers remarkably well. The only difference is 
that all financial activities are potentially involved and not only those with little added value. 
A  large  number  of  services  have  left  the  center  of  London,  New York  or  Paris  to  go  to 
peripheral areas (see graphs and maps in the Appendix). Historically, the United Kingdom's 
financial activities are highly concentrated in the City (The Square Mile), but since the mid-
nineties financial institutions have started to prefer Canary Wharf, located 3.5 km to the east 
on the banks of the Thames in an area formerly occupied by docks. This new business district 
now  accommodates  Credit  Suisse,  HSBC,  Citigroup,  Lehman  Brothers,  Morgan  Stanley, 
Bank of America and Barclays among others. It is also home to the Daily Telegraph and 
Reuters as well as the Financial Services Authority, a strong symbol.  
This type of movement can been seen even in New York. Rosenthal and Strange (2005) show 
that finance-insurance-real estate (FIRE) is the most geographically concentrated sector in 
New York (compared to industry, wholesale commerce and services). In contrast, the authors 
do not comment on the transfer of activities from Manhattan to New Jersey. This is one of the 
consequences of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks
14, but not the only reason. Pohl 
(2004)  discloses  that  these  transfers  were  already  under  way
15:  the  cost  of  rentals,  the 
problems  of  congestion,  the  decrepitude  of facilities  had  prompted a  number  of  financial 
companies to move. Recently, institutions as illustrious as Goldman Sachs, Chase Manhattan 
Bank, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Charles Schwab have moved to New Jersey.
16 
Paris is experiencing  a similar  situation: between  1993  and 2005, in  the  2nd  district,  the 
number of employees in the finance sector dropped by more than one half, going from 27,000 
to 12,000. The share of financial activities in the total employment picture is now only 21% 
compared to 35% in 1993. These moves have swelled the district of La Défense to the west, 
                                                
14 In September of 2001, the city of New York lost 25,000 jobs in the market finance sector. 
15 Orr and Rosen (1997) also calculated that some 9,000 jobs in the bond industry had left New York for New 
Jersey between 1993 and 1996. 
16 The number of employees in the financial sector in NYC as percentage of the US has been divided by two 
between 1973 and 2008.  where  the  number  of  employees  in  the  finance  sector  grew  by  about  20%. Additionally, 
suburbs to the east of Paris as well as to the north (Saint-Denis) have also benefited from the 
new location of financial activities (Capelle-Blancard et al., 2007). 
Before the crisis, financial activities mainly moved away from historic centers toward the 
peripheral areas.
17 In the future though, some activities will probably not be delocalized just 
to  the  suburbs  but  farther:  to  the  provinces  or  abroad,  with  jobs  being  transferred 
internationally.  
  
Should delocalizations be feared? 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the debate on delocalizations has taken on another 
dimension. Until then, delocalizations only involved industrial activities, but service activities 
are  increasingly  hit,  particularly  financial  activities.  It  is  difficult  to  quantify  this 
phenomenon,  there  are  few  existing  studies  for  the  time  being,  but  all  agree  on  the 
significance of the trend.
18 
Traditionally, the activities hardest hit by delocalization are those that can be standardized 
(little  experience  or  no  sophisticated  training  required).  For  the  financial  sector,  this 
essentially means support activities, such as accounting, IT, call centers and payroll services. 
It is also the case for back office and middle office activities with standard products like 
shares,  bonds,  foreign  exchange  and  short-term  financial  instruments,  based  on  explicit 
routines and procedures that can easily be commuted into specifications. Luxembourg has 
become an important center for back office and middle office activities in asset management; 
many German, Italian and French asset management firms have delocalized their depositary 
holder functions there. In contrast,  back  office and middle  office activities for innovative 
unregulated products, such as over-the-counter contracts, structured products and derivatives, 
are more difficult to externalize. They not only require rare skills but must also be located 
near  operational personnel  so that  the  nature of  orders can  be analyzed and  risks can  be 
judged as well as possible. 
In comparison with the above-mentioned activities, those with a high added value seemed to 
be protected from delocalization for a long time.
19 This was and still is the case for financial 
analysts and distributors who have everything to gain in remaining as close as possible to 
customers and issuers. Many foreign investment companies have offices in Paris, for example, 
and do manage some funds under French law, but they mainly employ analysts keep abreast 
of French companies and salespeople to distribute their home products to French institutional 
investors.  In contrast,  some  high  value-added activities, such  as front  office activities  for 
example, do not need to be near final users. As a result, there is every reason to fear that 
financial  evolution,  by  reinforcing  the  externalities  at  the  sector  level,  will  promote  the 
concentration of these activities and therefore their delocalization. This holds true for every 
                                                
17 An exception to this trend, independent hedge funds favored downtown areas: Mayfair in London, the 1
st and 
8
th districts in Paris (Tadjeddine, 2009). 
18 According to the Deutsche Bank (2004), one-quarter of German banks resort to delocalizations, a higher 
percentage than for manufacturing industries. The Deloitte Office (2004) reckons that 80% of the major banks 
(those with market capitalization of over 10 billion dollars) practice delocalizations, while 50% of smaller banks 
do so. In 2004, the ECB also conducted a survey with around a hundred EU banks. In 90% of the cases, they put 
forward cost cutting as the reason for delocalizations. 
19 Up to now, major banks have delocalized their head offices only when faced with political upheavals. This was 
the case, for example, of the Deutsche Bank moving from Berlin to Frankfort after Germany was divided into 
East and West. Another case was when HSBC moved to London in 1993 in anticipation of Hong Kong being 
returned to China. country  except  one  –  if  all  the  players  are  concentrated  in  a  given  financial  center,  it  is 
necessarily because the other centers have delocalized their activities there.   
  
Increasingly specialized and dispersed financial centers 
Whereas most observers anticipated financial centers to become more and more concentrated, 
the last few years have seen the reverse effect. On the international scale, financial activities 
are increasingly dispersed. There are two reasons for this – which have nothing to do with the 
financial  crisis  –  the  exploitation  of  the  comparative  advantages  of  each  center  and  the 
economic boom in the Middle East and Asia.  
Specialization  of  financial  centers.  The  restructuring  of  Canadian  stock  markets  in  1999 
illustrates  the  situation  very  well.  Until  then,  the  different  Canadian  stock  markets  were 
designed as comprehensive in nature the same as in Europe. In contrast, the 1999 agreement 
provides  for  specialization  by  market  sector:  large-cap  stocks  are  now  negotiated  on  the 
Toronto  stock  exchange  and  those  of  small  companies  on  the  Alberta-Vancouver  stock 
exchange. Lastly derivatives are all negotiated on the Montreal stock exchange.  
In the same way, in Europe the stock market consolidation process currently under way is less 
one of grouping activities than of polarizing them. National European financial centers had 
traditionally been comprehensive in nature and until the 1980s all the professional categories 
in finance were present on these integrated centers. This is no longer necessary, since with the 
unification  of  the  European  market  and  in  accordance  with  the  traditional  theory  of 
comparative  advantages,  there  has  been  a  diversification  by  professional  category  and  a 
specialization  of  financial  centers  along  the  same  lines  as  the  situation  prevailing  in  the 
United States. As such, London is still ranked first for currency instruments and derivatives, 
Frankfort is the leader for debt securities, while Paris maintains in a strong position for asset 
management.  
The booming Eastern stock markets. Historically a gradual disappearance of regional stock 
markets has been observed in Western countries. At the end of the 1990s, it was thought that 
this trend toward concentration would quickly continue beyond national borders and even 
accelerate because of demutualization. It is true that there was the creation of Euronext (2001) 
and then its merger with the NYSE (2006), as well as the grouping of Northern European 
stock  markets  under  OMX  Group,  then  its  purchase  by  the  Nasdaq  and  the  Dubai  stock 
market (2007). However, on the whole, there has not really been a decrease in the number of 
stock markets in industrialized countries. In contrast, during the same period of time, more 
than twenty stock markets have been created in the Middle East and Asia. In 2009, there is a 
grand total of over a hundred securities exchanges in the world – since the creation of a vast 
planetary market was expected, this fact is in itself symptomatic. Most of these stock markets 
are arguably minute and a number of them are highly likely to vanish as fast as they appeared. 
However, it is also certain that some of these newly created stock markets are in a position to 
reshuffle the cards in the world's market capitalization game.   
In 1990, the five largest financial centers in terms of market capitalization were the Tokyo 
stock exchange, the New York stock exchange, the London stock exchange, the Deutsche 
Börse and the Paris Bourse. These Top 5 accounted for three-quarters of the world's market 
capitalization  at  that  time
20,  but  the  percentage  fell  to  45%  as  of  the  end  of  2007.  As 
illustrated in Figure 2, the drop in the Herfindhal-Hirschman index is also indicative of a 
lesser concentration of stock markets and is mainly due to the rising power of new economic 
                                                
20 As a reminder, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany and France account for around half of 
the world's GDP and a twelfth of its population. players on the world scene – with China and India coming in first place. In the emerging 
countries, finance is what follows growth, and here again the 2007-08 financial crisis has 
amplified an already existing trend.  
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Note: Ranking on the basis of market capitalization. The Herfindhal-Hirschman index is equal to the sum of the 
square of the market share of all the stock markets that are members of the WFE. Data source: World Federation 
of Exchanges (2009). Calculation: Authors. 
 
 
The significance of a financial center should not be reduced to the size of its stock market, 
even though it is the easiest indicator to mobilize. If the importance of banks is used as a 
reference,  the  situation  is  even  more  desperate  for  Western  financial  centers.  As  of  the 
beginning of 2009, the three biggest banks in the world in terms of market value are Chinese: 
ICBC, China Construction  Bank and Bank of China
21,  whereas none of them  was as yet 
quoted in 2005.  
As far as foreign exchange activities are concerned though, their inertia is almost complete. 
London remains by far the dominant financial center with one-third of the transactions in 
2007, followed by New York (17%), Switzerland, Tokyo and Singapore (6%). Since the first s 
Triennial Central Bank Survey of Foreign Exchange  by the BIS in 1989,  the  Herfindhal-
Hirschman index has even slightly increased, going from 14% to 16%.  
  
                                                
21 These banks ranked respectively 12
th, 23
rd and 30
th in their sector on the Forbes listing that takes revenue, 
EBIT and book value into account, in addition to market value. The impact of the 2007-08 financial crisis on financial geography 
We have reiterated the fact that the financial crisis that began in 2007 had mainly had the 
effect  of  accelerating  trends  under  way  for  several  years.  However,  for  certain  financial 
centers, the impact of the crisis itself is particularly significant.  
In 2006, the record-breaking level of bonuses in the financial industry prompted Alan Hevesi 
of the Office of the New York State Comptroller to say: “When Wall Street does well, New 
York City and New York State do well”. This logic can be turned around – as illustrated in 
Figure 3, the number of employees in  market activities is closely  linked to  stock market 
performance. The impact on remunerations, in particular on bonuses, is also strong.  
 
Figure 3. Stock market performance and Wall Street jobs 
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Source: New York State Department of Labor & OSC.  The bursting of the Internet bubble between 2000 and 2003 in conjunction with the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11 resulted in the loss of 35,000 direct jobs, 10,000 indirect jobs and 60,000 
ancillary jobs for the city of New York, i.e. a total evaluated at over 100,000 jobs (Hevesi and 
Bleiwas, 2004). This meant lost business opportunities worth over a billion dollars for the city 
and $ 4.5 billion for the state.  
How much can the financial crisis have cost New York? As of the beginning of 2009, the 
crisis seemed to have calmed down. Without trying to outguess future developments, an initial 
assessment can be put forward: between the summer of 2007 and the spring of 2009, the city 
of New York lost over 30,000 jobs in the financial sector, i.e., for the time being, as many as 
between 2000 and 2003. More importantly, job losses seem to be more durable than after the 
Internet bubble burst, if only because the banks were directly hit. The main investment banks, 
the jewel in the crown of New York's financial industry, have now all disappeared and, in the 
same way, hedge funds have suffered a head-on collision with the consequences of the crisis.   
As of the beginning of 2008, the approximately 11,000 hedge funds registered in the world 
managed $ 2,150 billion and employed some 150,000 people. In one year, according to the 
Hedge Fund Research of Chicago, some 1,500 hedge funds have vanished, and the trend is 
only  just  beginning.
22  London,  where  alternative  management  had  been  considerably 
developed since the end of the 1990s, has turned out to be the hardest hit. According to data 
from the International Financial Services of London, assets under management in London 
have plunged by 37.2% (from $ 430 billion in 2007 to $ 270 billion in 2008), compared with a 
relative drop of 26.7% in New York (from $ 860 billion in 2007 to $ 630 billion in 2008). 
Hedge funds employed 40,000  people  in  London  (source: AIMA), and so large-scale job 
losses are expected in coming months. Overall, the City could lose up to 40,000 jobs.  
Besides New York and London, the financial centers hardest hit are obviously tax havens, 
under the dual effect of the decrease in international volumes and the expectation of stricter 
regulations. It is difficult to get any figures but, for example, the Cayman Islands Monetary 
Authority observed a drop of 30% in funds registered in the Cayman Islands in 2008, whereas 
in Luxembourg gross added value fell by 7.3% in the financial sector. 
On the contrary, the financial centers less exposed to the crisis have resisted job losses better. 
This is the case for Paris and Frankfort, which have not announced any drastic reductions in 
personnel for the time being.  
  
CONCLUSION 
Financial globalization has contributed to a reconfiguration of financial space and dictated a 
reconsideration of the notion of financial center, uncoupling it from exclusive reference to the 
stock market. The spatial dynamics of financial centers are complex as they act on different 
levels.  Financial  activities  are  no  longer  solely  located  in  the  downtown  areas  of  large 
metropolises, but this is not in contradiction with the idea of an increase in geographical 
concentration at the international level. Financial evolution has in fact reduced externalities 
within  the  company,  while  reinforcing  externalities  on  the  industry  level.  Professional 
categories in finance are highly heterogeneous and are therefore not exposed to centripetal 
and  centrifugal  forces in  the  same  way.  Only a  sophisticated  analysis of  these categories 
would allow predictions to be made about future financial geography. In any case, the risks of 
delocalization exist for activities of both high and low added value.   
                                                
22 The financial crisis had a delayed impact on  hedge funds  mainly due to the existence of barriers to the 
withdrawal of funds, or lock-up, which forced or encouraged investors not to withdraw their capital. It was only 
in the fourth quarter of 2008 that the extent of the disaster was realized. In the face of this new geography of financial centers, can the state still have a role to play? 
Even though we would like to believe that finance is depoliticized today, financial centers 
remain under the influence of politics, where the state exercises control. Fiscal policy and 
regulatory measures, as well as training and infrastructures are all public action tools to attract 
financial  activities.  Since  remuneration  is  no  longer  the  only  motivation  for  the  match 
between  manpower  supply  and  demand,  extra-economic  elements  such  as  social  welfare 
coverage, access to culture or education and quality of life have once again become factors 
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Note: Number of employees in the financial sector in London, in percentage of the total number of employees in 
the financial sector in the United Kingdom. Data: IFSL. Data before and after 1999 are not directly comparable.  
 



















NYC Securities Employment (thousands) - left scale % NYC to US Employment - right scale  
Data: US Department of Labor (BLS), New York State Department of Labor. Map of location of financial activities in New York  
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Note: FIRE Employment Density (Workers/Sq Mile) at the Tract Level At Establishments 3 Years or Less 
in Age in 2004:Q2. Source: Rosenthal and Strange (2005). Data: Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
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